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Abstract: 
Whether in the form of a carbon tax or cap-and-trade permit system, climate policy is likely to 
raise the price of all energy-intensive goods such as electricity, heating fuel, and gasoline. The 
fraction of income used on these goods falls with income, measured either by annual income or 
by total annual expenditure (as a proxy for permanent income). Thus, climate policy is found to 
be regressive on the “uses side” (e.g. Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 2009, and Hasset et al. 
2009). For these reasons, the economics literature and actual legislation have focused on whether 
permit revenue can be used to offset regressive burdens. 
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Article:  
Whether in the form of a carbon tax or cap-and-trade permit system, climate policy is likely to 
raise the price of all energy-intensive goods such as electricity, heating fuel, and gasoline. The 
fraction of income used on these goods falls with income, measured either by annual income or 
by total annual expenditure (as a proxy for permanent income). Thus, climate policy is found to 
be regressive on the “uses side” (e.g. Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 2009, and Hasset et al. 
2009). For these reasons, the economics literature and actual legislation have focused on whether 
permit revenue can be used to offset regressive burdens. 
In contrast, Rausch et al. (2010) use a computable general equilibrium model of the U.S. to find 
that carbon pricing is modestly progressive, even ignoring the use of the proceeds from a carbon 
tax or auctioned permits. One factor driving this surprising result is the progressivity of impacts 
on the “sources side”. Carbon pricing drives down returns to capital and to resource owners (both 
relative to the wage). Those returns are a large share of income sources for high income 
households. A second factor is their treatment of transfers. Rausch et al. (2010) hold real transfer 
payments constant as an element of their decision to hold government spending constant (and 
thereby isolate the effects of carbon pricing itself). Because transfer payments disproportionately 
accrue to low income households, the impact is progressive. This approach is justified in part 
based on the logic put forward by Browning and Johnson (1979) that government transfer policy 
is implicitly if not explicitly indexed. Some U.S. transfer programs such as Social Security are 
explicitly indexed to inflation, which means that higher energy prices would automatically lead 
to cost-of-living adjustments for recipients. 
This paper explores that assumption and the actual extent of indexing. We analyze both the uses 
side and the sources side incidence of domestic climate policy using an analytical general 
equilibrium model, taking into account the degree of government program indexing. In particular 
we consider three scenarios: no indexing, 100 percent indexing, and partial indexing based on 
our analysis of actual transfer programs. 
Using the model of Fullerton and Heutel (2010), we quantify the burdens of carbon pricing. The 
model is calibrated to the U.S. economy using expenditure and income data from the 2008 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and capital income data from the 2007 Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF). We then analyze the distributional effects of carbon policy in two 
ways. First, we categorize households by annual income. This procedure aggregates some with 
temporarily low income together with others who are perennially poor. Second, to employ a 
proxy for permanent or lifetime income, we categorize households by annual expenditures. 
See Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for a survey of literature on tax incidence. 
When families are categorized by annual income, we find that the uses-side incidence of a 
carbon tax is regressive. The burden on the sources side is U-shaped, with the largest burdens on 
the lowest and highest income groups. In addition, either partial or full indexing of transfers is 
progressive. Thus, an analysis that ignores current indexing rules will overestimate the 
regressivity of carbon pricing. 
Indexing has a more striking impact when households are ranked by annual expenditures. 
Regressivity on the uses side is offset by progressivity in transfer program indexing; the overall 
burden is progressive over the bottom half of the distribution and regressive across the top half. 
The choice of income measurement (annual v. lifetime) has a major impact on the measured 
progressivity or regressivity of carbon pricing. 
Analytic General Equilibrium Model 
We use the model of Fullerton and Heutel (2010), a two-sector closed economy analytical 
general equilibrium model in the tradition of Harberger (1962). Two fixed factors are mobile 
between sectors and fully employed, with full information, certainty, perfect competition, and 
constant returns to scale. A “clean” sector, X, uses only capital KX and labor LX, while a dirty 
sector, Y , uses both capital and labor (KY and LY) and a third input, pollution (Z). The model is 
then linearized by differentiating production and utility functions, budget constraints, zero profit 
conditions, and resource constraints. For a small change in the pollution tax, the N linear 
equations can then be solved for the Nunknown changes in each quantity and price. Fullerton and 
Heutel (2010)discuss the analytical results, and then calibrate the model to the U.S. economy, 
where the dirty sector includes electricity generation, transportation, and petroleum refining. 
Like Harberger (1962), we ensure that tax revenue reallocation has no impact on relative prices 
by assuming that pollution tax revenue is spent on the two goods in the same proportions as in 
consumer spending. We refer the interested reader to that previous paper for model, data, and 
sensitivity analysis. Using their primary set of parameters, for an increase in the tax on carbon 
dioxide from $15/ton to $30/ton, the price of the dirty good rises 7%, the wage rises 0.07%, and 
the return to capital falls by 0.12%.1 In order to translate those price changes into effects on real 
people, they look at thousands of households’ expenditure and income data from the 2008 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Their 
results for the effects of a carbon tax on output prices and factor prices appear in our tables 
below. The purpose of the current paper is to add consideration of indexed transfers. 
Table 1 summarizes the breakdown of income and expenditures by annual income decile. 
Columns 2 through 4 show the percent of each group’s income from wages, capital, and transfer 
income such as public assistance and social security. We omit the category “other income,” 
which accounts for less than 1% of total income. Although fractions vary by income group, 
about 69% of overall consumer income is from wages, 25% from capital, and 6% from transfers. 
Notice that the fraction of income from transfers falls as income rises (except that the lowest 
income decile has a slightly lower fraction than the next decile). The fraction of income from 
capital rises with income (but for the same exception). Then column 5 shows the percent of 
transfers that are indexed, as explained in the next section. On average, over 90 percent of 
transfer income is indexed in the U.S. The share of transfers that are indexed is lowest for the 
lowest income decile and highest for the highest income decile. 
Table 1. Sources and Uses of Income for each Annual Income Group 
(1) 
Annual 
Income 
Decile 
(2) % of 
Income 
from 
Wages 
(3) % of 
Income 
from 
Capital 
(4) % of 
Income from 
Transfers 
(5) % of 
Transfer 
Income 
Indexed 
(6) Dirty Good 
Expenditure as 
% of Income 
(7) Clean Good 
Expenditure as 
% of Income 
All 69.1 24.6 6.3 94.7 6.6 58.7 
1 35.8 5.7 58.5 87.2 47.4 361.0 
2 33.9 4.1 62.1 95.2 20.3 141.9 
3 55.1 6.5 38.4 96.1 16.7 116.5 
4 68.1 7.4 24.5 95.9 13.5 97.3 
5 79.9 7.8 12.2 95.2 11.1 84.0 
6 83.4 8.8 7.8 94.5 9.6 74.8 
7 86.6 9.1 4.3 93.6 8.3 68.0 
8 86.8 10.6 2.6 91.6 7.2 62.9 
9 84.9 13.2 1.9 94.8 5.9 58.1 
10 53.5 45.6 0.9 96.9 2.5 32.6 
 
In the last two columns, we show each group’s expenditures on the clean and dirty 
outputs.2 Each entry shows the ratio of expenditure over annual income, not over total 
expenditures, so these two values in each row do not add to 100%. The poorest households spend 
more than their income, while the richest spend less than their income. 
To map output price changes into consumer price changes, we label consumer goods as clean or 
dirty. Four types of expenditures out of 74 are categorized as dirty because they directly involve 
the combustion of fossil fuels: electricity, natural gas, fuel oil and other fuels, and gasoline. This 
choice is consistent with a more complete analysis of the pass-through of the costs of 
intermediate goods: for a CO2 tax of $15 per metric ton, Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf 
(2009) find that the prices of these four goods increase by 8-13%, while the prices of all other 
categories of goods rise less than 1%.3 
Overall, in table 1, we see that 6.6% of income is spent on these dirty goods, and about nine 
times as much is spent on clean goods. The expenditures pattern for these annual income groups 
is smoother than their pattern for income sources. Lower income households spend a higher 
fraction of their total income on dirty goods than do higher income households. 
Table 2 presents the same information, but where households are classified by annual 
expenditure as a proxy for lifetime income. Income from wages now constitutes over 100 percent 
of expenditures, reflecting the fact that the households in our dataset save roughly one-third of 
income. The share of income from capital rises monotonically across expenditure groups, while 
the transfer share falls monotonically. This pattern will be relevant below, when we consider the 
progressivity of carbon pricing. 
Table 2. Sources and Uses of Income for each Annual Expenditure Group 
(1) Annual 
Expenditure 
Decile 
(2) Wage 
Income as % 
of 
Expenditures 
(3) Capital 
Income as % 
of 
Expenditures 
(4) Transfer 
Income as % 
of 
Expenditure 
(5) as % 
of 
Transfer 
Income 
Indexed 
(6) % of 
Expenditures 
on Dirty 
Good 
(7) % of 
Expenditures 
on Clean 
Good 
All 105.8 37.6 9.7 94.7 10.1 89.9 
1 42.8 13.5 63.5 93.6 14.5 85.5 
2 74.5 13.8 36.6 95.2 15.2 84.8 
3 86.3 16.2 26.8 94.5 14.6 85.4 
4 103.5 18.0 17.7 94.6 13.9 86.1 
5 108.8 20.4 13.8 94.9 13.2 86.8 
6 114.4 29.4 10.0 94.1 12.3 87.7 
7 118.8 31.2 7.3 94.5 11.5 88.5 
8 120.0 38.4 5.7 94.6 10.8 89.2 
9 124.6 45.1 3.9 95.3 9.3 90.7 
10 93.4 54.7 2.4 96.9 5.9 94.1 
 
The Treatment of Indexing in our Model 
In this paper, we provide results for three different treatments of government transfers’ indexing 
to the price level. First, we show distributional effects of carbon pricing that ignore indexing 
entirely. These results can be compared to previous papers in this literature that also ignore the 
indexing of transfers. Second, we show results for 100% indexing of all transfers, as in Rausch et 
al. (2010).4 Third, we show results based on a calculation of the actual indexing of U.S. 
government cash transfers. 
Table 3 shows the six categories for cash transfers in the CEX data, along with the mean amount 
for each category (the average annual receipts per household in the survey). The first category is 
unemployment compensation (UC). Because UC benefits do not extend more than a year, they 
are not indexed to inflation. Thus, we assume that an increase in energy prices would not raise 
the amount of these transfers. 
Table 3. Six Categories of Cash Transfers, and their Treatment in our Model 
Category Symbol Meana Treatment in 
the model 
1 unemployment compensation UC 114.5 Not indexed 
2 income from public assistance or welfare, including money 
received from job training grants such as Job Corps 
TANFb 30.1 Not indexed 
3 value of all food stamps and electronic benefits received SNAPc 100.6 Not indexed 
4 amount of Social Security and Railroad Retirement income, SSA 4047.3 100% indexed 
prior to deductions for medical insurance and Medicare 
5 Supplementary Security Income SSI 230.7 100% indexed 
6 income from workers’ compensation or veterans’ benefits, 
including education benefits, excluding military retirement 
WC&VB 100.4 100% indexed 
a “Mean” is the annual dollar transfer, averaged over all households in the sample. 
b TANF stands for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the major welfare program. 
c SNAP stands for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps). 
 
The second category includes a broad set of public assistance and welfare programs, best 
exemplified by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). In the U.S., each state 
administers its own welfare programs, so indexing is decided by each state. For the states we 
have studied, welfare benefits are intended to be temporary and therefore not officially indexed 
to inflation. Of course, a state might periodically decide to raise the benefit level, and may do so 
because inflation has reduced the real value of those benefits, but these programs typically are 
not explicitly indexed. 
The third category is “food stamps,” officially known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) maintains the real purchasing 
power of the program by calculating the cost of a “thrifty food plan” to set benefits each year. 
SNAP is essentially indexed to a food price index. In our model, however, food is a component 
of the “clean good” (because the food industry’s use of energy is small and indirect). No change 
in the price of food means no increase in food stamp benefits. Thus, SNAP is not indexed to 
energy prices. 
The fourth category of transfers is by far the largest, including all payouts from the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) and Railroad Retirement programs. The fifth category is 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the sixth category of transfers includes both workers’ 
compensation (WC) and veterans benefits (VB). The statutes treat all of these programs similarly 
in terms of indexing. SSA and SSI payments are adjusted each year by the Consumer Price Index 
for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). This index uses the CEX weights for 
different goods purchased by urban workers, representing 32% of the U.S. population. It is thus a 
broad based index, best approximated in our model by an index of all consumption of all 
households. 
Numerical Results 
We consider the effects of doubling the CO2 tax from $15 to $30 per ton. The incidence results 
for our annual income classification of households are presented in table 4. As in Fullerton and 
Heutel (2010), we normalize the calculated uses side burden for each group by subtracting from 
it a uses side calculation for the entire sample (because the choice of numeraire is arbitrary). A 
positive value means that group’s ratio of expenditures to income increases more than average, 
while a negative value means it increases less than average. The calculation is analogous for 
factor price changes and transfers. This procedure ensures that our results are not affected by the 
choice of numeraire. We change the sign on the sources side, however, so that groups with 
income falling more than average have a positive “burden”, while groups with income falling 
less than average have a negative burden. Finally, to calculate each group’s normalized overall 
burden, we sum effects of output prices, factor prices, and transfers. 
Table 4. Incidence for Annual Income Deciles (%) 
(1) 
Annual 
Income 
Decile 
(2) Relative 
Burden 
from Output 
Prices 
(3) Relative 
Burden 
from Factor 
Prices 
(4) Relative 
Burden from 
Transfers 
(5) 
Relative 
Overall 
Burden 
(6) Relative 
Burden from 
Transfers 
(7) 
Relative 
Overall 
Burden 
1 2.936 0.001 −0.214 2.723 −0.249 2.689 
2 0.986 0.001 −0.253 0.733 −0.266 0.720 
3 0.724 −0.012 −0.148 0.565 −0.153 0.560 
4 0.496 −0.020 −0.083 0.393 −0.086 0.389 
5 0.323 −0.028 −0.027 0.268 −0.028 0.267 
6 0.216 −0.029 −0.006 0.180 −0.007 0.180 
7 0.123 −0.031 0.009 0.101 0.010 0.101 
8 0.045 −0.029 0.017 0.032 0.018 0.033 
9 −0.051 −0.025 0.020 −0.056 0.021 −0.054 
10 −0.297 0.036 0.024 −0.236 0.026 −0.235 
 
In the first column, the pattern of uses-side burdens clearly shows that the highest income groups 
(deciles 9 and 10) suffer a smaller than average relative burden. The cost of goods decreases for 
them relative to the average, because they spend less than average on the dirty good. Since the 
clean good is our numeraire, the average increase in overall price is about 0.48% (a 7.2% jump in 
the price of a good that constitutes 6.6% of annual income). Thus, table 4 says that the highest 
income group’s price increase under this normalization is only about 0.18%, whereas the lowest 
income group faces an overall price increase of about 3.4%. Our results here are consistent 
with Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf (2009), who study the uses-side incidence of a CO2 tax and 
find that the burden falls across income deciles monotonically. For a cap-and-trade 
policy, Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls (2009) find the same kind of regressivity on the uses side. 
In the second column of table 4, the sources-side burden is most on the highest and lowest 
income deciles. The positive burdens for the lowest deciles indicate that their incomes fall 
proportionally more than average. Columns (4) through (7) show how these basic uses and 
sources side impacts are affected by indexing. Columns (4) and (6) indicate that indexing of 
transfers adds progressivity to carbon pricing. The difference in the two columns is small, 
because explicit indexing applies to a large share of U.S. transfers. Analyses that ignore transfer 
program indexing will overestimate the regressivity of carbon pricing. Using annual income, 
however, we do not find that the effect of indexing is sufficient to overcome the regressive 
effects on the uses side. It remains to be determined why these results differ from those 
of Rausch et al. (2010). 
Table 5 presents results for the analysis where we classify households by annual expenditures as 
a proxy for lifetime income. The uses side burden is significantly less regressive than in table 4. 
The sources side burden from factor price changes is initially regressive but then progressive 
over the top 60 percent of the distribution. The effect of indexed transfers continues to be sharply 
progressive under either partial or full indexing. Now, however, the overall burden from carbon 
pricing is mixed, with progressivity over the bottom half of the distribution combined with 
regressivity over the top half. 
Table 5. Incidence for Annual Expenditure Deciles (%) 
(1) Annual 
Expenditure 
Decile 
(2) Relative 
Burden 
from 
Output 
Prices 
(3) Relative 
Burden 
from 
Factor 
Prices 
(4) Relative 
Burden 
from 
Transfers 
(5) 
Relative 
Overall 
Burden 
(6) Relative 
Burden 
from 
Transfers 
(7) 
Relative 
Overall 
Burden 
1 0.316 0.016 −0.367 −0.034 −0.393 −0.060 
2 0.366 −0.006 −0.187 0.173 −0.196 0.164 
3 0.319 −0.012 −0.118 0.189 −0.125 0.182 
4 0.273 −0.022 −0.055 0.196 −0.058 0.193 
5 0.218 −0.023 −0.029 0.166 −0.030 0.165 
6 0.157 −0.016 −0.002 0.139 −0.003 0.139 
7 0.099 −0.017 0.017 0.098 0.018 0.099 
8 0.046 −0.009 0.028 0.064 0.029 0.065 
9 −0.063 −0.005 0.040 −0.028 0.042 −0.025 
10 −0.303 0.029 0.050 −0.223 0.053 −0.220 
 
In other words, we find that the automatic indexing of government transfers in existing statutes 
converts the net loss from carbon pricing into a net gain for the poorest group (categorized by 
total expenditure, as a proxy for permanent income). A major caveat, however, is that a third of 
these households receive no transfer income and thus clearly lose from climate policy. For either 
type of indexing, about 40% of this poorest group have an overall relative burden that is almost 
0.8% of income (higher than the economy-wide average), while the rest have a relative gain that 
is 0.7% of income (less burden than the economy-wide average). Thus, automatic indexing of 
transfers does not protect all of the poorest families in our sample. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we use a general equilibrium model of tax incidence to examine the burden of 
carbon pricing. We find generally that changes on the uses-side are relatively more burdensome 
for low income households who spend more than average on dirty goods such as electricity, 
natural gas, gasoline, and heating oil. Because carbon-intensive industries tend to be relatively 
capital-intensive, we find that the sources-side is relatively more burdensome for those who have 
a more than average share of income from capital. Thus, the burden is U-shaped when 
households are categorized by annual income, given the capital/labor income ratios in our data 
from the CEX and SCF. Transfer policy adds progressivity, but not enough to overcome the 
regressive uses-side effects. 
Categorizing households by annual expenditures tells a different story. Now the uses side 
impacts are less dominant, so the overall burden of carbon pricing is progressive across the 
bottom half of the distribution and regressive across the top half. Impacts from factor price 
changes are hump-shaped, with the greatest relative losses at the top and bottom of the 
distribution. The indexing of transfers confers significant progressivity to the system. The choice 
of income measurement (annual v. lifetime) has a major impact on the measured progressivity or 
regressivity of carbon pricing. Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf (2009) provide a discussion of this 
point. 
The model could be improved by a number of extensions, such as adding more sectors, more 
final goods, intermediate goods, or market power and regulation. Electric utilities are large 
emitters of CO2 and are often highly regulated, so the effect of market power or industry 
regulation may be of particular relevance to a carbon tax. 
Footnotes 
1 The return to capital falls because the dirty sector is capital-intensive, not because capital and 
pollution are complementary inputs. In our parameters, capital is a better substitute for pollution 
than is labor. In sensitivity cases, the return falls by more if labor is a better substitute for 
pollution, and it rises if capital is a better substitute for pollution. Burdens on the sources side are 
always smaller and more sensitive to parameter values than those on the uses side. 
2 In the CEX, the overall ratio of expenditure to annual income is 78.7%, but our addition of 
imputed capital income from the SCF then reduces it to 65.3% (shown in the top row of table 1). 
This figure is lower than the 85% figure in table 2.1 
(http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=Y) of the National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA). We could scale all household expenditures upward so that their sum 
is 85% of income as in the NIPA accounts, but we want to avoid unnecessary manipulation of 
the data. In any case, a proportional scaling would not change our relative burden results. 
3 Air transportation prices increases by 1.86%, but rather than list spending on that item 
separately, the CEX lumps air transport with public transportation. 
4 This treatment might also be preferred for reasons discussed in Browning (1985). He argues 
that the theory of tax incidence is based on the presumption that only relative prices matter, not 
the overall price level, and that any treatment of transfers other than 100% indexing would 
violate that principle. 
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